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THE LAw or FUTURE INTERE S s. By Lewis M. Simes.; St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1936. Vol. I, pp. xv, 52Z; Vol. II, pp. xv, 556; Vol. III,
xv, 583. $25.00.
THE xVRITER who enters upon the field of future interests in land is well
advised to walk delicately, as did Agag before Samuel. He may well feel
the earth tremble beneath his feet, for the mighty have walked that way.
Immediately before him went Gray, the exquisite scholar of glowing intel-
lectual integrity, and Kales exultant in the joy of combat. Across the water
in the home land of the common law went Challis, Williams, Sugden,
Preston and Fearne and a host of others whose keen minds and exact
scholarship have adorned this page of the law, clear down to Bacon, the
incredible Coke, and Littleton. Yet Simes' huge work-for, alasl it is in
three volumes-is different from the treatises of all these luminous authors.
It could have sprung only from American soil. One is tempted to say it
could have been written only beyond the Alleghany -ountains, and not
on the Atlantic seaboard, now only four days distant from the land where
Fearne loved and sang the glories of the Common Law. But for all that,
this admirable work deserves an equal place on the same shelf with those
of the great sages of the law, the shelf nearest to the heart and the reaching
hand of any lawyer concerned with the law of real estate. And yet it is
very unlike any of these predecessor works; unlike in style, in its treat-
ment of precedents, in its approach to the problems that clutter the field,
in its awareness, apparent in almost every paragraph, that the ways of America
are not the ways of England.
Ve lawyers are disposed to prize excellence in style, the right choice
of words, too little. Having before us the shocking example of what can
be accomplished by the use of bad language, of unfamiliar words of uncertain
meaning, in darkening -an already obscure subject, afforded by the recently
completed Restatement of the Law of Property by the American Law
Institute, we are the more grateful to Professor Simes for preserving his
sense of values in choosing the words he should use, and that, as he says
in his preface, "He has thought it preferable to redefine the old terms with
care and to use them in the belief that more real understanding of his
meaning will be transmitted to the reader than if brand new words, un-
hampered by confusing connotations, were employed." Hence when he
wishes to refer to that remarkable and elusive property interest which has
for nearly four centuries been called a "contingent remainder,' he calls it
just that, and not a "remainder subject to a condition precedent.' It is
quite true, of course, that all words and phrases are tricky things, slippery
as eels and apt to change their meanings right before your eyes, and the
phrase "contingent remainder," even when examined on a background of
1. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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centuries of judicial construction, is hearly as uncertain of meaning as, say,
the word "electron" or "ether," but for all that it has a far more clearly
defined connotation than the elusive phrase "condition precedent." So we
are even more grateful for his discarding the uncertain and undiscriminating
phrase "power of termination" which the American Law Institute has en-
deavored to substitute for the familiar "right of entry" of the common law
literature, which Professor Simes retains. It may be true that the person
who has a right of entry no longer makes entry, but neither is a daughter
any longer the milker of the family cow. But no one suggests that we dis-
card the word because in these effete days our daughters milk not, neither
do they spin.
Professor Simes makes free use of Hohfeld's admirabl system of legal
analysis whenever it serves to make his meaning clearer, but the Hohfeld
terminology is used sparingly. His practice in this respect is well illustrated
in the same section in which he defines "right of entry." One admires his
self-restraint, for it is painful to read dissertations whose every paragraph
drips with redundant "rights, powers, privileges and immunities."
Passing from mere verbalism, it is pleasing to note that our author's style
of writing is like his scholarship, wholly unpretentious. Indeed, despite
the abstruse quality of his subject, we may say that it is simple, and crystal
clear. If the reader shakes his head over any of his sentences, it is because
he finds it difficult to accept, and not because it is difficult to understand,
his meaning.
In commenting on the style in which it is written, one finds it interesting
to contrast this work with that of Gray and Kales, the outstanding American
authorities in this field. Gray's style is also clear, and crisp withal, but his
sentences are instinct with remote and scholarly emotion. They show his
zeal for righteousness, his intense desire that truth shall prevail and be
defended from attack, whether such attacks come from Kales, his one-time
pupil, or from his "learned friends" across the water. They also show his
abiding love of the English common law, his deep faith in the wisdom that
lies embedded in 1he common law precedents, however antiquated the con-
ditions to which they refer or black the letters in which they are reported.
Throughout Kales' writing glows the heat of combat. His hand may hold
only a pen, but in his mind he wields a broad sword. A sound scholar, a
keen thinker, his real reward was found in the joy of battle. Not so Simes.
He is no crusader. He has no cause to defend. He has no divinely inspired
truth to which he would convert the world, whether or no. He shows no
disposition to. smite the heathen, to overthrow the wicked or even to expose
the ignorance of those who differ from him. This seems to make out his
writing to be dull; but it isn't. Rather is it the writing of a scholar of
balanced judgment, of keen but serenely poised mind, who looks about him,
sees things as they are in the cornfields and the factories of America, and
turning with scant reluctance from the English precedents, he records and
interprets the dealings of American legislatures and courts with existing
American conditions. And all this he does so thoroughly, so realistically-




As already stated, this is an American treatise on the American law of
future interests. As a work on the English law, it would scarcely be deemed
adequate. Of course so well grounded a scholar would not neglect the
English sources from which so much of our law has sprung, and the reader
finds all the leading English cases cited, and many of them analyzed and
critically discussed. Occasionally he leaves room for regret that this process
was not carried further. For example, problems arising out of the English
practice making gifts of chattels (heirlooms), to accompany lands settled
in tail "so long as the rules of law will permit" are very inadequately con-
sidered 2 while no reference whatever is made to the most interesting recent
decision on the question, Poriman v. Portman,3 which we do find cited in
notes to remote passages dealing With different and less interesting points.
It is -very true that the matter in hand and the ruling of the House of
Lords in Portman v. Portman possess little significance for American law-
yers, since we do not have settled lands, and have very few heirlooms. They
might have been wholly omitted with little loss to the work. But if con-
sidered at all, they should have been treated more critically.
But such trifling blemishes are few. Most of the important English doc-
trines are treated fairly and adequately, and with insight that is notable.
But the preponderant attention to American law is gauged by the fact that,
by a rough estimate based on a partial count, less than ten per cent of
the eight thousand cited cases are English. Further evidence of the modem
quality of the work is found in the obvious fact that a very large proportion
of the American cases cited are of relatively retent decision. One would
guess that over one-half of them bear date within the current century. This,
however, should cause no surprise, since future interests nearly all arise out
of some kind of family settlements. The family settlement presupposes ac-
cumulation of property; and property accumulations are not functions of a
pioneer society.
Professor Simes' admirable simplicity of style occasionally slips into a
too easy colloquialism, as when he speaks of the abolition of "Shelley's
Case,"4 whereas he means the rule in that famous case; or when he says
"one contingency may be held valid, etc,"' ; when he means that "the gift
on one contingency may be held valid." Such petty slips only a little
mar the pleasure of one's reading. But it is a more serious matter when
the author's scholarship, which, as previously indicated, is broad, humane
and easy rather than acute and critical, on rare occasions, tends to become
too easy. Thus, for example, the peculiar rule long established in the
English courts, and known, for lack of a better descriptive phrase, as the
doctrine of fraud on a power, has only recently assumed importance in this
country with increasing accumulations of wealth. By far the most important
American case involving this doctrine is Chcnowith v. Bullittc but the
2. Section 459.
3. [1922] 2 A. C. 473.
4. Section 84, p. 146.
5. Section 521, p. 391.
6. 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928).
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reader seeks in vain for any reference to it in the section" in which the
subject is discussed, although the case is cited elsewhere on another point.
The treatment is otherwise too summary, making no critical distinction
between frauds on a power and excessive exercise of it.8
Too much cannot be said in praise of the wide knowledge and broad
understanding exhibited in the author's presentation of the rule of per-
petuities as merely one phase of the general policy of the law to prevent
unreasonable restraints upon the alienation of property, rather than as a
rule apart, revealed from on High to Lord Nottingham in the decision of
the famous Duke of Norfolk's Case0 and applicable only to the vesting of
contingent future interests, as Gray would have it; but it is believed that
he misunderstood and needlessly rejected" Professor Bryant Smith's brilliant
explanation of what has been regarded as the anomalous application of the
rule to the so-called honorary or indestructible trusts, which, it is said, are
present vested interests.'0 The peculiarity of these trusts is said to be that
there are no cestuis que trust who can enforce them, and Gray contended
that on that account they were void." Professor Bryant Smith's contention
is that the real cestuis que trust are the heirs at law or next of kin, who
hold the equitable title to the property subject to be defeated by the trustee's
purely optional exercise of his power to carry out the donor's instructions.
If such be the contention, Professor Simes' objections to it fall to the
ground and we have a much desired simplification of a rule that is com-
plex enough at best.
Again it seems that Professor Simes lies down too easily before the ab-
surdity of the English rule epitomized in Rider v. Ford,12 in which it was
held that of two alternative options to the lessee in a lease for more than
twenty-one years, one to purchase the fee, and the other to purchase a
term of ninety-nine years, the former was obnoxious to the rule of per-
petuities, while the latter was not. The much more reasonable decision
arrived at in the American cases, such as Keogh v. Peck13 is quite clearly
brought within the recognized scope of the rule.14
But to make such petty criticisms of such a great work is much like
objecting to the fly-specks on a statue of heroic size. The work is monu-
mental in 'its compass, admirable in its execution. Professor Simes, by his
huge undertaking, splendidly achieved, has laid the legal profession, and
especially all teachers and students of this confused and difficult branch of
the law, under a lasting debt of gratitude.
7. Section 290.
8. See "(1936) 46 YALE L. J. 344.
9. 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682). '
10. Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rile Against Perpetuities (1930) 30 CoL
L. Rzv. 60.
11. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUIES (3d ed. 1915) §898.
12. L. R. (1923) 1 Ch. 541.
13. 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266 (1928).
14. See Corhment (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 2i3. This Comment was evidently over-
looked by the author as no reference to it has been found.
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One regrets to say that the form in which the work is published is. equally
unworthy of the character of the treatise and of the famous publishing house
that puts it out. It is bound in three volumes, when two would have served
far better. The index is grossly inadequate, and in the printing some of
the dearest traditions of legal publication have been violated, such for
example, as the practice of always first giving the official citation of cases.
Here the unofficial citations are first given. It is quite aside from the




THE Nn r OLD MsN. By Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen. New York:
Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1936. Pp. 325. $2.50.
IT wYAY well excite wonder that a scholarly journal should deem it appro-
priate to notice a book like this. Perhaps it is because the subject is an
important one. Perhaps it is because shabby gossip is so likely to have a
wide appeal that the book itself may seem to be important because of the
number of its readers. Unfortunately the iumber of readers is not likely to
be -curtailed by advance warning that the book is vulgar in language, vulgar
in tone and innuendo, and guilty of enough inaccuracies to be unreliable in
general even though much of what it tattles may be true. When truth and
distortion and error are intermingled, even a large percentage of truth is
not a sufficient saving grace. The authors themselves did not hear the
remarks of the Justices which they quote. They did not have dictaphones
concealed within each robe. They are gossips at second hand or at some
greater remove. Their handling of oral tradition can hardly claim confidence
when they prove themselves so peccable in dealing with historical facts.
The one historical chapter is called "The Lord High Executioners." It
contains a plenitude of error. It is not true that the Constitutional Con-
vention rejected a proposal for judicial review as established by Marbury v.
Madison. The proposal in the Convention to include the Justices in a council
of revision was quite different. Some who opposed it did so on the ground
that the Court would have its say after statutes were enacted. It is well
known that the members of the Convention were divided upon this point.
It is gross error to say that this rejection of the proposed council of revision
and the grant of the veto power to the President "indicated that there was no
doubt whatsoever in the minds of the founding fathers that the Supreme
Court was given no power to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Con-
gress." It is silly to sum up Marshall's argument in Marbury vi. Madison by
saying that "Therefore the entire Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional"
Had this been true, the Supreme Court would have deprived itself of its
whole appellate power until there was a legislative regrant.
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
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It is not true that Chief Justice Black in Sharpless v. The M11ayor reaffirmed
the view of Chief Justice Gibson in Eakin v. Raub. The latter Pennsylvania
jurist declared only .tat laws not prohibited by the state constitution may
not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the spirit
of the constitution. He said: "I am thoroughly convinced that the words
of the constitution furnish the only test to determine the validity of a statute,
and that all arguments, based on general principles outside of the constitution,
must be addressed to the people, and not to us." Cases in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court may naturally be somewhat remote from the direct concern
of two journalists. Perhaps they'heard about them from others who chanced
to be in error. Yet he who hath eyes to see hath a way of checking denied to
him who hath only ears to hear.
The legal result of Luther v. Borden was not that "Rhode Island and its
insurrectionists were forced to settle their dispute between themselves."
There was a .point of Presidential recognition that the authors fail to note.
It must be carelessness and not ignorance that makes the authors say of the
Dred Scott case that "Chief justice Taney held up the final verdict until
after the inauguration of James Polk, newly elected Democratic President,
in March 1857", for elsewhere they give a different family name to the in-
coming chief executive. It is more difficult to explain what made them say in
connection with the Dred Scott case that "Justice Grier was so senile that
Charles Evans Hughes tells how a committee of his fellow justices eventually
asked him to retire." The Dred Scott case was decided in 1857. "Eventually"
came in 1870 after the first Legal Tender Cases. Many men are not senile
thirteen years before they become so. In speaking of changes in the Court
after 1876, the authors say that "Justices Strong, Clifford, Swayne and Hunt,
all remnants of the Civil War days and inheritors of the Jacksonian states'
rights theory, either died or resigned." Clifford was appointed in 1858;
Swayne in 1861; Strong in 1870; and Hunt in 1872.
How little the authors know of the Constitution or of constitutional law is
evident from their comment on the Fourteenth Amendment. They quote the
second sentence of Section 1 and add that "On these half-dozen lines, the
Supreme Court was to build the all-dominant power it exercises today."
Still referring to "these lines," they continue:
"Instead of protecting the Negro race, they have been used to ensure long
and gruelling factory hours for both white and colored, to block legislation
which would preserve wage standards for both white and colored, to continue
the employment of children, both white and colored, to delay the adoption of an
income tax against the representatives of wealth and property,.and to crush
every important social and economic reform attempted by federal and state gov-
ernments in the last half century."
In so far as this statement applies to state action, its accuracy is a matter of
judgment. The beginning words "No State shall make or enforce" should,
however, have warned the authors that the Amendment does not forbid any
federal action. It was not the Fourteenth Amendment that was invoked to(
defeat the federal income tax or national efforts to restrict the employment of
children. The only relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to Con-
(Vol. 46
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gressional action is that it confers some power to enforce prohibitions against
state action. That this power has. been judicially restricted more than the
Radical Republicans desired, may be conceded. This, however, does not save
the authors from a bad blunder on a most elementary matter.
Messrs. Pearson and Allen may of course have a passion for accuracy and
a capacity for achieving it as purveyors of gossip that they lack as reporters
of law and history. This can hardly be a matter of prodf. If assumed, it must
be assumed on faith. The tone and attitude of their gossip chapters is close
enough to the tone and attitude of their pseudo-scholarship to make one
doubt whether unreliability stops at scholarship's edge. Nowhere in the book
is there any display of those qualities of mind that inevitably command con-
fidence. There is abundant display of qualities of mind that inevitably compel
rejection or suspicion. Even some of the gossip can be checked. Justices
no longer wear frock coats. Harry Shulman's given name is not Henry;
his family name is not spelled Schulman; and he is not a former student of
Mr. Justice Stone. John Dickinson was not an ancestor of John Dickinson.
Such mistakes do not greatly matter in themselves. They do not greatly
concern the function of the Supreme Court and the merits of its performance.
Untrue trivialities are little more trivial than true ones. Had the authors
escaped error, they would still be devoid of merit. Greeks bearing such gifts
must be feared by the justices whom they praise. Justices whom they slur
and belittle must prefer that such gifts, if they must needs come, should
come from such Greeks.
THomAs RFD PowELL-f
Cambridge, Mass.
AN INTRODUCTORY SuRvEY OF THE SoRmcEs AND LITERATURE OF ScOrs LAW.
By Various Authors. Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1936. Pp. xv, 486.
"THE inaugural volume which the Stair Society now presents to its mem-
bers contains the first comprehensive survey of the sources of Scots law
which has ever been essayed." This survey consists of a collection of thirty-
eight monographs on as many different subjects, by various authors. Thirteen
of these articles have to do with "native sources"; eight with "non-native
sources"; six with "indirect sources"-- a heading not self* explanatory, but
including charters, cartularies, Vatican archives, brocards, notarial protocol
books, style books, and Scottish legal periodicals;*eleven with "special sub-
jects'-among which are found admiralty and maritime law, the law of
nations, heraldic law, peerage law, and "udal" law-this latter having refer-
ence to the law which came to the Orkneys and Shetlands with Norse emi-
grants as early as the seventh or eighth century.
Each of the monographs has been constructed on the same lines: (1)
list of sources or repositories, (2) commentary, (3) literature, frequently
with (4) an appendix. This scheme has had the result of producing a series
tProfessor of Law, Harvard University.
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of excellent critical bibliographies, some of them on subjects in regard. to
which very little writing has as yet been done. "The special value of the
present compilation is that for the first time it furnishes . . . those . . .
who are interested in .the history of Scots Law with a reasonably complete
guide, well documented and equipped with useful bibliographies." But the
work as a whole is considerably more than a set of bibliographies. In sum
total there is a really' large amount of historical information on Scots law.
And this in spite of the brevity of the individual monographs. For none of
them is long; some of them are noticeably short, the average length being
only twelve pages. This brevity is deliberate and in keeping with the general
editorial plan, which was, as pointed out in the introduction, not to attempt
to make the work either exhaustive or final. As the title indicates, the book
as a whole is a preliminary survey of many fields, with breadth, rather than
depth, the object.
One can not but wonder why such a survey has not been made long before
this. It was certainly not because of any paucity of material; that is sufficient-
ly abundant-if not very old. It can hardly be called early; rather, one is
immediately impressed by the comparative lateness of the source material
for the "native sources" group of monographs. The dates of even the earliest
fields' are late when compared with those in English legal history where the
extant plea rolls go back in practically unbroken line to 1194 and the extant
financial records are even older. The English Year Books are themselves
comparatively late-1292 to 1535, but the bulk of these Scotch records are
from a -period subsequent to the Year Books. In other words, the extant
native source material for Scots law, when compared with the same sort of
material for English law, is quite recent.
One of the older of the Scotch sources which has been "treated as an
authentic repository of old Scots laiv by many of our leading writers, and
employed as a more or less reliable and authoritative source throughout the
whole of the early formative period of Scottish legal principles and institu-
tions" 2 is the Regiam Maiestatem, a fourteenth century version of the first
:English law treatise, that of Glanvill which bad been written toward the
end of the twelfth century. This adoption by the early Scotch lawyers of
an English common law book has never been altogether explained. They
may have been attracted -by the definitiveness and orderliness of Glanvill's
law as contrasted with their own. For, "it was comparatively late before
Scotland had any general or definite body of native customs which could
be appealed to as constituting the common law-until the Constitution of
the Court of Session in 1532 the administration of justice was in the hands
of many local tribunals whose judges acted largely according to their own
discretion' . . . The absence of any record of the decisions of the various
courts and the differences in their practice prevented the growth of any
considerable body of common law."3
1. I.e. FINANCIAL AND ADM.IINISTRATIVE RECORDS 1264-1724; BURGH COURT RECORDS,





Among the subjects in the first group is that of "Practicks, 1469-1700.
This title, for most American readers, at least, needs a word of e-planation.
Meaning first simply something done or practiced in the past, that is, a pre-
cedent, the term came to be used in the technical sense of a decision. Thus
in 1634 a case was decided "conform to a Practick betwixt (AandB), 1630,
which was produced and alledged." As now applied, "Practicks" designates
not only that type of book made up of notes on decisions, but also that which
constitutes a digest or encyclopedia of law. These books were common in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at least a dozen of each type-by as
many different writers--being noted in the list of sources.
A Scotch background would seem to be desirable, if not essential, for a
thorough understanding of the subject matter in many of these articles;
their real significance can hardly be grasped by one not conversant with the
history of Scots law. But tis is not to be said of all the articles. Some of the
topics discussed are of wide and general interest, and capable of being under-
stood by one who has had no training in Scotch law. This is true of most
of the subjects in Group II, which includes "Roman Law," "Canon Law,"
"The Influence of English Law," "The Law Merchant," and "The Law of
Nature"--to mention these especially. The story of the influence of all, or
of any, of these-brief as the tale is-will make interesting reading for many
whose own particular fields lie quite outside that of Scots law per se.
Now that the Stair Society has broken the ground, we may be fairly con-
fident that other books on Scottish legal history will follow. Though the
plan on which this initial survey has been constructed has not been conducive
to exhaustive treatment of the subjects discussed, it can hardly fail to stimu-
late further research leading to final and definitive scholarship on many
points that are barely touched upon in these preliminary studies.
G ORGE E. WODBINl
New Haven, Conn.
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, VOL. V, 1929-1931. Edited by M\anley 0.
Hudson,' with the collaboration of Ruth E. Bacon. Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1936. Pp. xi, 1180.
AFTER a silence, of five years, Mr. Hudson has resuzned his series devoted
to the reproduction of the great multipartite treaties which concern either
public or private international law. It is to be hoped that his inclusion of
several documents having dates in 1932 and thus beyond his time limitation
as stated on the title page does not indicate a termination of this series,
for such volumes have sa definite value for the small library which does not
include either Mfarten's Nouveau recueil gin6ral de trait6s or the League
of Nations Treaty Series.
tProfessor of History, Yale University.
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19371
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The welcome extended the earlier volumes has already decisively indi-
cated the merit of the system used in reproducing the various documents.
The listing of texts by number, chronological order and subject matter and
the index are mechanical features which make such collections a really
efficient tool, and which deserve a second greeting. This volume is also
the richer for a more expansive use of bibliography.
The solution of great traffic problems, whether the instrument is an auto-
mobile or a ship, and of the questions concerning commercial paper, are
examples of these important multipartite treaties, which so often escape
attention and which Mr. Hudson has brought together in such convenient
form. Although the treaties on such economic and commercial problems have
undoubted importance and their collection is desirable, it is particularly
fortunate that, although he felt called upon to explain and justify their in-
clusion, Mr. Hudson has gathered into one volume the documents on repar-
ations, which ordinarily are scattered. The same felicitous judgment was
shown in the inclusion of the 1930 Hague codification treaties.
PHOEBE MORRISONt
New Haven, Conn.
tAssistant in Research, Yale Law School.
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